According to Jim Pryor's dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore's infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore's proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn't deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.
This paper aims to shield dogmatism from a possible criticism. Pryor (2004: 359-362) contends that (DOGMA) validates Moore's proof of a material world and he seems to see this as an antisceptical virtue of dogmatism. Since Moore's proof is widely and persistently regarded as flawed, one might fear that if the dogmatist were actually committed to accepting Moore's proof as cogent, this would be perceived as a problem rather than a virtue of dogmatism. I will not endorse dogmatism in this paper. I will confine myself to arguing that if dogmatism is true, then Moore's proof is actually flawed because it is non-transmissive of justification in one of the senses of nontransmissivity described in Wright (2002) . Remarkably, this type of non-transmissivity doesn't deprive dogmatism of the antisceptical bite that Pryor thinks it has.
A popular version of the sceptical argument states that:
(SCEPTIC) Since you cannot have justification for believing that there is a material world (i.e. something material), you cannot have justification for believing that there is any specific material thing-for instance a hand-when you have an experience as if there is such a thing. Moore (1939) W. Pryor takes this deficiency to be a dialectical limitation of (MOORE)-one restraining its possible uses-rather than an epistemic or structural flaw of it (cf. 366-370). Wright (2002) has defined some conceptual tools that can help the dogmatist explain why (MOORE) is epistemically flawed. Let's first distinguish between closure of justification and transmission of justification. A basic formulation of the closure principle (sufficient for our purposes) says that, for any deductive argument from P to Q, if one has justification for believing P and knows that P entails Q, one has justification for believing Q. Suppose one is given evidence E in support of P. Wright says that one's justification for believing P depending on E transmits across the entailment from P to Q just in case: (i) one actually has justification for believing P from E, (ii) one knows that P entails Q, and (iii) one has a justification for believing Q just in virtue of the satisfaction of (i) and (ii) (cf. 2002: 332) . Whereas closure has been seldom questioned in epistemology, it is acknowledged that transmission sometimes fails. Interesting cases of transmission failure are those in which (i) and (ii) are satisfied but (iii) isn't. In these cases one has justification for believing Q (provided that closure holds true) but not in virtue of the satisfaction of (i) and (ii). Here is an example from Wright (2003: 59) . Imagine you are informed that Jessica and Jocelyn are indistinguishable twins, and consider this argument:
(TWINS) J. This girl is Jessica.
Therefore:
N. This girl is not Jocelyn.
Suppose evidence for J is your learning that (L) this girl looks just like Jessica. Given your background information, L can give you justification for believing J only if you have independent justification for believing N in the first instance. Suppose you actually have independent justification for believing N. As you learn L, you also have justification for believing J.
Furthermore, you are certainly aware that J entails N. Yet it is intuitive that in this epistemic setting you cannot have justification for N in virtue of your justification for believing J depending on L and your knowledge that J entails N.
Following Moretti and Piazza (2013: § 3 .1), let's say that a deductive argument from P to Q is non-transmissive of justification depending on E for P across the entailment just in case condition (iii) couldn't be satisfied even if conditions (i) and (ii) were both satisfied. Being non-transmissive is a different property from being a failure of transmission. Any non-transmissive argument is epistemically defective in the sense that it is structurally incapable of conveying justification to its conclusion even if its premise is justified by the relevant evidence and the conclusion is known to follow from the premise. Wright (2002) has individuated two conditions individually sufficient for non-transmissivity of justification, which can be formulated as follows:
(FAIL1) E gives one justification for believing P only if this justification is based on one's independent justification for believing Q. Any deductive argument from P to Q satisfying either condition relative to E is non-transmissive of one's justification for P depending on E. I clarify (FAIL2)'s content and workings below. An explanation of (FAIL1)'s functioning is given in Moretti and Piazza (2013: §3.2) . Wright (2002) contends that (MOORE) satisfies (FAIL1) relative to O because O gives one justification for H only to the extent that this justification is based on one's independent justification for W. (MOORE) is thus non-transmissive of one's justification for H depending on O. The dogmatist cannot accept this diagnosis because it is incompatible with the thesis that O provides immediate justification for H (cf. Pryor 2004: 356) . Nevertheless, it appears to me that if dogmatism is true, (MOORE) proves non-transmissive because it satisfies (FAIL2).
Consider any deductive argument from P to Q that meets (FAIL2) relative to E. Saying that E gives one direct justification for believing Q is saying that E gives one justification for believing Q independently (or not in virtue) of one having justification for believing P from E and knowing that 5 P entails Q (cf. Wright 2002: 334) . Clearly, any argument of this type is such that (iii) couldn't be satisfied even if (i) and (ii) were satisfied. Thus any such argument is non-transmissive of one's justification for P depending on E. Here is an example by Wright (cf. 333):
(SOCCER) G. Jones has just scored a goal.
S. A game of soccer is taking place.
Suppose evidence for G is your learning that (B) Jones has kicked the ball between the white posts and events typically accompanying soccer goals have happened alongside (e.g. the team mates' congratulations, the referee's response, etc.). On the background assumption that it is very unlikely that B is true unless S is true, B gives you justification for believing both G and S. This looks like a case in which B gives you direct justification for believing S. To see this, consider that if the justification that you have from B for S were one acquired by you in virtue of your having justification from B for G and knowing that G entails S, it would presumably be true that hadn't you had justification from B for G, you wouldn't have had justification for S. But this conditional looks false on standard counterfactual semantics because in closest possible worlds (to the imagined actual world) its antecedent is true and its consequent false. Take for instance a world in which, just before learning B, you learn that a referee's assistant has raised his flag signalling Jones' off side.
Here B no longer give you justification for G and yet it still gives you justification for believing S.
(Cf.: 334-335).
Wright agrees that (FAIL2) illuminates why (SOCCER) is non-transmissive
4 but he denies that (FAIL2) could also explain why (MOORE) is non-transmissive. Wright concedes that O would give you direct justification for W if you had independent justification for believing that (K) it is very unlikely for people to experience O unless W is true. But he suggests that in the dialectic setting of responding to the sceptic-the one surrounding the use of (MOORE)-you cannot take yourself to have justification for believing K (cf. 337). Whether or not Wright's suggestion is correct, it seems to me that you don't necessarily require independent justification for K to acquire from O direct justification for W. Suppose O could give you direct justification for W coinciding with immediate justification for it. Since immediate justification is not based on independent justification for anything else, you could very plausibly have it even if you had no independent justification for K.
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I will now argue that if dogmatism is true, O gives you immediate justification for W that also qualifies as direct justification for W. To defend (DOGMA), Pryor adduces the popular thesis in current philosophy of mind that our experiences are often provided with propositional contents, where these contents 'are not about sense data or the character of our experiences. They are about manifest observable properties of objects in the world' (Pryor 2000: 539) . According to this view, in other words, our experiences are typically about things represented as being non-mental or material. 6 Pryor maintains that an experience with propositional content P can prima facie justify belief in P because of its assertive phenomenology characterised by 'the feeling of seeming to ascertain that [P] is true' (Pryor 2004 : 357. Cf. also Pryor 2000 . It is the assertive phenomenology of experience that provides the subject with immediate defeasible justification for believing the experience's content (cf. Pryor 2000: 538-539 and 2004: 357) . It appears to me that if this is true, any subject who has an experience with content P should have immediate justification for believing P as well as any proposition constituting a part of that content.
Suppose T is the proposition that there is a tomato. It is implausible that you could have an experience with just T as its content. For experiences about things in the world are typically richer than T. (This is so even if we set aside the contentious issue of non-conceptual content.) If you experience as if there is a tomato, you will have the experience as if there is a specific tomato provided with distinctive physical features. Suppose, therefore, that the actual content of your experience is the complex proposition that (C) there is a roughly spherical, small, vermilion… tomato in the middle of the whitish scenery before you. In this case, if you concentrate on the 7 content of your experience as a whole, you will have the feeling of ascertaining the truth of C. But if you turn your attention to parts of the content of your experience, you will have the feeling of ascertaining the truth of more elementary propositions constituting components of C-for instance T, or the proposition that (T*) there is something roughly spherical before you. Consequently, if the phenomenology of seeming to ascertain the truth of a given proposition provides you with immediate justification for believing that proposition, the same experience that gives you immediate justification for believing C should also give you immediate justification for believing propositions like T and T* constituting parts of C. 
